In an adversarial common-law courtroom, where one party tries to defeat the other by using words as weapons, polysemous words more often than not pose a problem to the court interpreter. Unlike in dyadic communication, where ambiguity can be easily clarified with the speaker by the hearer, court interpreters' freedom to clarify with speakers is to a large extent restricted by their code of ethics. Interpreters therefore can only rely on the context for disambiguating polysemous words. This study illustrates the problem of polysemy in an interpreter-mediated rape trial. It exemplifies how the interpreter's goal to avoid contradictions by making her interpretation of a polysemous word consistent with the preceding context runs counter to that of the bilingual cross-examiner, whose primary goal is to identify inconsistencies in the hostile witness's testimony in order to discredit him. This study also manifests a denial of the interpreter's latitude in the interpretation of contextual clues and her loss of power in a courtroom with the presence of other bilinguals.
Introduction

The bilingual Hong Kong courtroom
From 1842, when Britain began its colonial rule over Hong Kong, until 1974, when Chinese was given official status in Hong Kong, English was the only official language and trials in all courts were conducted in English. In a trial conducted in English, court interpreting is a sine qua non, as witnesses and defendants involved in trial proceedings are predominantly Cantonese-speaking. These lay-participants are either monolingual, or not sufficiently confident to testify in English, which for most of them is only a language they learned at school and may have used at work. The liberty to use Chinese in all courts after the changeover of Hong Kong's sovereignty in 1997 has resulted in an increasing use of Chinese (i.e. Cantonese) for trial hearings over the past decade, especially in lower courts. In the High Court however English remains the dominant language (see E. . Statistics from the Department of Justice show that in 2009 over two thirds of the criminal trials in the Court of First Instance of the High Court and almost half in the District Court were still conducted in English, though Magistrates' Court cases were mostly heard in Cantonese 1 . Hong Kong is therefore, as K. H. Ng (2009: 120) puts it, 'one of the most "interpreted" legal systems in the world' and ironically, unlike in most other jurisdictions, court interpreters are hired to serve not the linguistic minorities, but the linguistic majority (E. Ng, 1997; K. H. Ng, 2009: 120) .
Power of the interpreter
In an interpreted encounter, where the interpreter is the only bilingual, s/he is cast in a highly important role in facilitating a communicative act among the monolingual interlocutors, who otherwise would not be able to interact with one another. Anderson (2002) suggests that the interpreter's position in the middle 'has the advantage of power inherent in all positions which control scarce resources'. This advantage allows interpreters considerable latitude in defining their own behaviour and greater control over the interaction, and to translate selectively, while their monolingual clients are not able to ascertain the difference unless they overstep 'rather wide bounds ' (2002: 212-213) .
In the bilingual Hong Kong courtroom however, interpreters do not enjoy this inherent power because the chance of working with bilingual legal personnel and even bilingual lay-participants is high. This inevitably subjects the interpreters to external pressure as their performance is scrutinised throughout the trial by the bilinguals, who can always comment on or even challenge their interpretation. In other words, the power of the interpreter in the Hong Kong courtroom is considerably reduced, as Anderson expresses it, 'the power of the interpreter disappears, if a client happens to be bilingual ' (2002: 214) . In case of a dispute over the interpretation of a single word or an expression, the bilingual legal professional, being a powerful participant in the courtroom, always has an upper hand over the interpreter as I will demonstrate with my data below.
Language in the adversarial courtroom
The adversarial common-law courtroom relies heavily on the oral presentation of evidence. There is therefore a metaphor of the trial as a war of words, where opposing parties try to defeat each other by using language as their weapons (Maley & Fahey, 1991: 3) , and 'in which only one side will win' (Danet, 1980: 190) . Language is the medium through which competing versions of the same reality are constructed and presented to an impartial audience, i.e. a jury or a judge. While the prosecution tries to construct a story that will prove the guilt of the accused, the defence strives to present one that will at least create a reasonable doubt in the judge's or the jury's minds. The success or failure of the battle hinges to a large extent on how effectively language as a weapon is used by the parties. The strategic use of language thus becomes all-important, as Hale rightly points out, '[n] owhere does language play a more important role than in the adversarial courtroom ' (1997: 201) .
In her study of the O.J. Simpson trial, Cotterill (2003) illustrates how the attorneys employed strategic lexical choices in their attempts to orient the jury towards a particular perception of the trial events and personalities. The prosecution, through the use of words with negative prosodies and connotations such as 'encounter' and 'control', aimed to portray Simpson as an aggressive and violent wife-beater. The defence on the other hand strove to dismiss the alleged cycle of violence as mere 'incidents', 'domestic disputes', 'verbal debates' and even 'conversations'. She suggests that 'through the skilful exploitation of different layers of lexical meaning, it is possible for lawyers to communicate subtle and partisan information about victims and alleged perpetrators ' (2003: 67) . Danet's (1980) oft-cited study of a trial in a US court, where an obstetrician gynaecologist was charged with and later convicted of manslaughter in connection with a late abortion, best illustrates the power of language in the Anglo-American adversarial courtroom and the metaphor of the trial as a war of words. During the trial, the prosecution strategically referred to the result of pregnancy (RP) as 'baby', 'child' or 'person', which all carry the quality of aliveness and thus justify a manslaughter case. The defence on the other hand opted for terms such as 'foetus', 'embryo' or 'product of conception', which convey the notion that the RP was still inside the mother's uterus and was not alive in the full sense, and therefore the abortion could not have constituted the crime of manslaughter. Through the strategic use of language both sides aimed to persuade the jury to return a verdict in their favour. The conviction of the defendant shows that the prosecution succeeded in this war of words.
Polysemy, ambiguity and context in court interpreting
Polysemy refers to the association of one word with multiple meanings. The particular meaning of a polysemous word needs to be decided by the context in which it occurs. Polysemous words can be problematic in the courtroom as opposing parties attempt to arrive at meanings favourable to their case, especially when more than one meaning is possible in a particular context or due to a lack of context. In other words, the very nature of polysemy means that contextual ambiguity is often an inevitable result. Danet points out that ambiguity about the meaning of events is part of our everyday life, but '[w]hat makes the legal process an especially attractive setting in which to study this problem is that in the law, decisions must be made ' [italics hers] (1980: 190) .
In dyadic monolingual communication, contextual ambiguity can be easily clarified, although in the adversarial courtroom, counsel for the opposing side may sometimes want to leave intact a piece of ambiguous information in a witness's testimony. Court interpreters however, bound by their professional ethics, cannot freely clarify with the speaker about the intended meaning of an ambiguous utterance as interlocutors in a dyadic monolingual communication usually do. Moreover, the use of 'short consecutive' as the norm in legal interpreting (De Jongh, 1992: 38) , whereby the interpreter works with relatively short chunks of information at each turn, means that the contextual information available to the interpreter in court examination is, 'limited to the local context unfolding at each turn' (Lee, 2009: 94) , or what Hatim and Mason (1997: 50) refer to as the 'local cohesion' covering no more than two or three sentences. Hatim and Mason suggest that to overcome this limitation, liaison interpreters, (a term which includes court interpreters), 'resort to a more readily accessible strand of textuality' or what they later refer to as 'context ' (1997: 50) . This means that court interpreters, like other liaison interpreters, have to rely heavily on the local linguistic context for their interpretation of an ambiguous utterance. The contextual information available to the court interpreters is limited, not only because of the mode of interpreting used in court, but also because interpreters are often denied access to the case file to prepare in advance for the trial for reasons of confidentiality. It follows that interpreters do not have the same access to the contextual information of a trial as do the other participants in the court proceedings: the witnesses and the defendant have direct experience of the case at trial and have had their own (and presumably different) versions ready to tell the court; counsel must have familiarized themselves with all the details of the case before the trial starts; by contrast the interpreter is kept in the dark. That is to say, court interpreters often lack the means-clarification questioning and context-required for disambiguating an obscure item, which may prove detrimental to the accuracy of the interpreted evidence as exemplified by Kredens and Coulthard (forthcoming) . In their example, a Polish interpreter had in a police interview erroneously interpreted the alleged rape victim's evidence about the defendant's penetration, in the absence of a prepositional phrase, as a marked oral penetration instead of an unmarked vaginal one. This is ostensibly a result of the interpreter's lack of contextual knowledge of the case and thus her need to rely on the local linguistic context, as well as her adherence to the ethical code by refraining from clarifying with the speaker. Had she been briefed on the details of the allegation before the interpreting took place, or had she taken the liberty to clarify the ambiguity with the speaker, the error would have been avoided.
The notion of context is central in any interaction. Drew and Heritage (1992: 18) define context in interaction as both 'the immediately local configuration of preceding activity in which an utterance occurs' and the 'larger environment of activities within which that configuration is recognised to occur'. They suggest that utterances are doubly contextual in that they are both context-shaped and context-renewing because while the interpretation of an utterance is decided by the context in which it occurs, 'the current utterance will itself form the immediate context for some next action in a sequence... ' (1992: 18) .
Following Drew and Heritage, Ehrlich suggests that the question-answer sequences of a trial are illustrative of the doubly contextual nature of utterances, as a question in a question-answer sequence depends on previous utterances for its production and interpretation, and at the same time it shapes and constrains the utterance (the answer) that will follow (2001: 31) . This is echoed by Janney who notes that 'interpretations of utterances depend on information provided by earlier utterances in the sequence and, at the same time, constitute information necessary for interpreting later utterances in it ' (2002: 458) . This suggests that interlocutors, whether in ordinary conversations or courtroom interactions, do benefit from earlier utterances in their interpretation of later, in particular, ambiguous utterances.
Interpreters working in the courtroom however do not enjoy the same degree of latitude as other participants in the proceedings do in their interpretation of contextual clues. The views that the interpreter should just translate, not interpret and that the role of the interpreter is to act as a mere conduit still prevail in the legal sphere (e.g. Hussein, 2011; Morris 1995) , though empirical studies (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale, 2004; Roy, 2000; Wadensjö, 1998) have demonstrated to the contrary. All these studies reveal that interpreters play an active role in negotiating meaning with the primary participants and in making sense of what is said by them. When it comes to the interpretation of ambiguous words or expressions, the interpreter's decision to opt for one meaning rather than another based on the contextual clues may attract criticism from parties who decide that it would favour their case if the word were interpreted otherwise.
Data and aims of the study
This study represents a small portion of a larger research project on the reality of courtroom interpretation in Hong Kong. The data for the entire research project consists of recordings of 9 criminal trials from the three levels of courts in Hong Kong, namely, the Magistrates' Court, the District Court and the High Court, totaling over 100 hours of recording time 2 . The recordings were transcribed, following conventions for transcribing conversations (cf. Silverman, 2006) , with information containing personal data changed or concealed in the transcript to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.
The present paper focuses on a High Court rape case, and aims to illustrate the problem of polysemy in an interpreter-mediated trial conducted in English and the divergent strategies adopted by the cross-examiner and the interpreter in the pursuit of their respective goals. In the case under discussion, both the Prosecution and the Defence Counsel are bilingual in English and Cantonese, but the judge speaks only English. The point at issue is the polysemous Cantonese word saam1 3 衫 uttered by the defendant in his evidence in chief.
Analysis
Meanings of saam1
The word saam1 in Cantonese (or shān in Mandarin Chinese) is polysemous. The Chinese New Dictionary (Liu, 1993) gives two meanings to this Chinese character:
1. 單上衣 (upper garment);
2. 泛指衣服 (a generic reference for clothes).
In other words, saam1 can be a generic term to refer to clothing/garment (usually used without a quantifier), or a more specific term, usually used with a quantifier gin6 件 (piece), to refer to a piece of clothing worn on the upper part of one's body (a shirt, a blouse, a jumper and even a jacket)-upper garment, which is how it is usually translated in the Hong Kong courtroom if it is understood in the latter sense. However the use of a quantifier alone does not serve as a clear-cut distinction between the meanings of this problematic word. For example, the expression ngo5 dong1 si4 mou5 zeok6 saam1我當時冇着衫 (without the presence of a quantifier gin6) can be taken to mean BOTH 'I was not wearing any clothing at that time, i.e. being naked' AND 'I was not wearing any upper garment at that time'. In other words, the absence of gin6 does not automatically give the word a generic sense, and vice versa. For example, the utterance ngo5 jat1 gin6 saam1 dou1 mou5 maai5 dou3 我一件衫都冇 買到 is usually understood to mean 'I didn't buy even a single piece of clothing' despite the presence of the quantifier gin6. The argument in this case lies in the interpretation of the meaning of this particular word in Cantonese.
Prosecution case
It is the prosecution's case that the victim, Miss M, was raped by the defendant in his home. Miss M, a lesbian, had been a cohabitant of the defendant's sister and had for over a year lived in the same premises where the defendant resided and where the alleged rape subsequently took place. On the day of the incident, Miss M's homosexual relationship with the defendant's sister had broken up and she had moved out of the flat, to which she returned to pack her belongings. At the material time no one was home except the defendant. According to Miss M, and the defendant's own evidence, the defendant was wearing only a pair of shorts prior to the sexual intercourse, without any clothing on the upper part of his body. Miss M was raped while she was lying on the top bed of a bunk for a nap after packing her belongings, and she could not resist the defendant's advance as she was weak and feeble at the material time. Miss M did not report to the police immediately after the incident because she was confused, but talked to her friends before a report was finally made to the police.
Defence case
The defendant did not dispute having sex with Miss M, but alleged that the sexual intercourse was consensual. He elected to testify in the witness box and described in his evidence in chief how Miss M pulled his saam1 while he was standing on the ladder of the bunk bed, which he took as an invitation for him to go up to the bed. He acted accordingly and had sex with her on the bed. 4. 4. I And then, she used her left hand to pull the um (.) garment at my eh waist area.
The Interpreter's strategy
Note that the quantifier 件gin6 is used before the word saam1 by the defendant, which seems to suggest a more specific meaning of the word-upper garment. However, the interpreter's choice of the word 'garment' in her interpretation seems to be a well-deliberated decision, bearing in mind that it had been established in both Miss M's and the defendant's previous own testimony that the defendant was not wearing any 'upper garment' throughout the whole incident. The use of the word saam1 with the quantifier gin6 by the defendant seems to take the interpreter by surprise. Her request in turn 2 for the answer to be repeated without first asking for the court's leave to do so may be regarded as a delaying tactic to buy her time as she searches for an English equivalent for the Cantonese word saam1. Note also the filler 'um' and the brief pause before she utters the word 'garment' in turn 4. Apparently, the interpreter, having gained the extra time from the defendant's repetition of his answer and a brief hesitation of her own, decides to opt for an interpretation consistent with the alleged victim's and the defendant's earlier evidence. In other words, the witness's and the defendant's earlier utterances have shaped her interpretation of the word in question. Her goal to strive for unity and consistency nonetheless goes against that of the cross-examiner.
The cross-examiner's strategy
In cross-examination, it is the goal of the examining counsel to discredit the hostile witness and hence the opposing side's version of events. The usual strategy is to identify inconsistencies or contradictions in the witness's testimony so as to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury or the judge. It follows that when faced with a polysemous or an ambiguous word or expression in a witness's utterance, what the cross-examiner is after is an interpretation which will create contradictions or inconsistencies with the witness's earlier utterances. The interpreter's rendition of saam1 as 'garment', which has in effect removed a possible contradiction with the defendant's earlier utterances, was nonetheless not challenged by the prosecutor at this stage. It is possible that the prosecutor wanted to leave a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jurors, who were all English/Cantonese bilinguals, with Cantonese as their native language 4 and would most likely rely on witnesses' testimony in Cantonese, rather than the interpreted version for their verdict. Challenging the interpreter's rendition in the defendant's evidence in chief would give the Defence Counsel an opportunity to clarify with the defendant over what he meant by his utterance of the word saam1, which would most likely result in the contextual ambiguity and hence a reasonable doubt being removed.
Instead, the prosecutor chooses to question the credibility of the defendant's testimony in his cross-examination of him by pointing out to him the contradiction in his evidence. In the following extract of the transcript, the prosecutor first gets the defendant to confirm that he was not wearing any upper garment during the whole event. 
.garment at the waist position?
Note that the Prosecution Counsel uses 'upper garment', in both turn 5 and turn 9, despite the interpreter's rendition of the word saam1 as 'garment'. In the Cantonese interpretation in turns 6 and 10, the interpreter has to add the word soeng6上(upper) before saam1-soeng6saam1-to differentiate it from the more ambiguous word saam1 and of course her rendition of it as 'garment'. However, since the actual word uttered by the defendant is saam1, not soeng6saam1, the interpreter must have realised the need to reconcile the discrepancy in her Cantonese interpretation in turn 10 when she hesitates after rendering 'upper garment' as soeng6saam1 and finally settles on saam1, in an obvious attempt to make her interpretation consistent with the actual word used by the defendant, and presumably her interpretation of it as 'garment' as well. It must also be noted that the term soeng6saam1 is marked and not an ordinary or idiomatic expression. The prosecutor's challenge of the defendant's evidence has now necessitated the expatriate judge's review of his notes. The judge, being monolingual in this context, can only follow the testimony based on the English interpretation. As the interpreter has rendered saam1 as 'garment', not 'upper garment', his notes show no inconsistency in the defendant's testimony. The following extract demonstrates the discussion between counsel and the judge in this regard.
prosecutor is tantamount to the confession of an interpretation error, whereas insisting on her earlier interpretation would for sure spark further heated discussion and would most likely attract criticism or even hostility from the prosecutor. The former would entail a loss of face on the part of the interpreter while the latter would obviously be seen as a confrontation to the authority, neither of which seems to be an easy way out for the interpreter. In any case, a decision has to be made. In this case, since the judge does not speak Cantonese, he cannot act as a referee and therefore has to leave the matter entirely in the hands of the interpreter as indicated in turn 1 of Extract 9. The interpreter's response in turn 2 is ambiguous and has led the judge to believe that she would leave the interpretation as just 'garment' (turn 3). The judge seems to be taken aback by the interpreter's decision to adopt the prosecutor's suggestion and there is also a tone of resignation in his utterance in turn 5. 
J 'upper garment', okay. <sighing > Right
Now having successfully established that saam1 equates with 'upper garment', the prosecutor goes on to suggest to the defendant that since he was not wearing any upper garment at the material time, there was no such pulling by the victim and that the alleged invitation from her is a story invented by the defendant.
Re-examination by Defence Counsel
Seeing that the defendant's evidence has been attacked by the Prosecution Counsel for want of consistency, which could be potentially damaging to the defence case, the Defence Counsel makes use of the re-examination process to give the defendant an opportunity to account for the contradiction. In Extract 10 below, the Defence Counsel tries to clarify with the defendant what he means by his utterance of the very word saam1. Notice the omission of the quantifier gin6 by the Defence Counsel in his quotation of the defendant's earlier testimony. In turn 1, Extract 1, the defendant says '我件衫，啫係腰度件衫' (ngo5 gin6 saam1, zek1 hai6 jiu1 dou6 gin6 saam1-my piece of garment/upper garment, that is, the piece of garment/upper garment at the waist area), with the placing of the quantifier gin6 before saam1 in two places in his initial utterance. When asked by the court interpreter to repeat his answer, the defendant says in turn 3 of the same extract '腰部份嘅件衫' (jiu1 bou6 fan6 ge3 gin6 saam1-the garment…piece of garment/upper garment at the waist area) as an elaboration of his answer in turn 1, which again includes gin6 before the word saam1. However, this utterance is not grammatical, with the insertion of the possessive particle ge3 before gin6 as ge3 and gin6 are syntactically redundant and semantically mutually exclusive. As has been pointed out earlier, the use of gin6 before saam1 in this context tends to give saam1 a more specific sense. By contrast, the use of ge3 before saam1 is likely to make it a generic reference. It seems that the utterance of ge3 by the defendant in the first place is a slip of the tongue, which he has then corrected to gin6. Now the Defence Counsel must have realised the damaging effect that the use of gin6 might have on the credibility of the defendant when he quotes the defendant's earlier testimony with this word omitted. This has the effect of rationalising the defendant's subsequent explanation about his intended meaning of saam1.
Conclusion
This study has sought to illustrate the metaphor of the trial in the adversarial courtroom as a battle of words and to demonstrate the problem of polysemy in an interpreter-mediated trial. It exemplifies how the interpreter's aim to avoid contradictions by making her interpretation of a polysemous word consistent with the preceding context runs counter to that of the crossexaminer, whose primary goal is to identify inconsistencies in the hostile witness's testimony in order to discredit him.
Meanwhile, this study manifests the external pressure the interpreter is subjected to and a loss of power on the part of the interpreter in the encounter when the interlocutor(s) happen(s) to be bilingual as suggested by Anderson (2002) . In the case under study, the bilingual skill of the examining counsel has empowered and enabled him to challenge and 'correct' the interpreter's interpretation of the ambiguous utterance to suit his purpose. The interpreter, on the other hand, has seen her power as a communicator in the encounter diminished by the bilingual counsel and her latitude to interpret an ambiguous utterance based on earlier utterances is obviously restrained; she is, as Fenton (1997: 30) puts it, characterised as someone who is not supposed to 'take an intelligent, thinking interest in the proceedings'. The study also exemplifies the dilemma the court interpreter is faced with when the accuracy of her interpretation is called in question. Her concession may also be regarded as a submission to the power in court, where the power asymmetry between lay-participants and legal professionals is palpable. 
